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DEVIANT DREAMS: EXTREME ASSOCIATES AND
THE CASE FOR PORN,
Sienna Baskin*
There's a difference between watching entertainment and feeling hey,
that's not my, you know, cup of tea. I could do without seeing that for
the next [thirty] years of my life, and saying, "You know what? The
person who made that should go to prison. "2
[A] person's inclinations and fantasies are his own and beyond the
reach of government.3
INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST BATrLE IN THE WAR ON PORN
"I guess this means we've won the war on terror," responded
one frustrated FBI agent when he learned of the government's new
priority for investigations and prosecutions: obscene pornogra-
phy.4 Attorney General Gonzales has announced his intention to
resurrect the federal obscenity statutes, which have lain virtually
unused for a decade, to prosecute purveyors of pornography whose
products violate community standards.5 His public statements on
the subject make clear that the campaign will target obscenity
1 The term pornography and its abbreviation will be used interchangeably in this
essay. "Pornography" comes from the Greek pornographos, a synthesis of the word for
prostitute (porne) and the word for write (graphein). MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE
DIcriONARv 966 (11 th ed. 2003). Pornography is "the depiction of erotic behavior (as
in pictures or writing) intended to cause sexual excitement." Id.
* CUNY School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2007. The author would like to thank
Professor Ruthann Robson, Professor Andrea McArdle, Lena Ramon, and Davim
Horowitz.
2 Interview by Bob Garfield with Rob Black, Co-Owner of Extreme Associates, in
NewYork, N.Y. (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/transcripts.
042304_crackdown.html. Rob Zicari, aka Rob Black, co-owns Extreme Associates, Inc.
with his wife Janet Romano, aka Lizzie Borden.
3 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
4 Barton Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2005, at
A21. Pornography is not "low value speech" just by virtue of its references to, or
portrayals of, sex. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir.
1985). Sexual speech is fully protected under the First Amendment, unless and until
a jury finds it to be obscene. Only obscenity can be criminalized. The "dim and
uncertain line" between fully protected speech and a prison sentence is a troubling
area of First Amendment jurisprudence. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
66 (1963).
5 Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks for U.S. Attorney's Con-
ference (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/042105usattor
neysconference.htm.
155
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:155
made, bought, and viewed by consenting adults.6 The Bush Ad-
ministration has set aside funding for a special FBI anti-obscenity
squad and, at the Department ofJustice, an Obscenity Prosecution
Task Force.7 Richard Green, Deputy Chief of Obscenity, will head
the Task Force with Bruce Taylor, a veteran of Reagan-era obscen-
ity prosecutions.8 Gonzales and the Department of Justice have
been the target of both praise9 and criticism' for their newfound
zeal. Some news sources speculate that the anti-porn fervor must
be the result of pressure from Bush's Christian supporters. 1"
The criminal indictment of Extreme Associates, 12 a hard-
core1 3 Internet pornography website, was intended to be the first
victory in the new so-called war on porn. 4 While still in prepara-
tion, the case was described as a warning shot for the industry.15
Mary Beth Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, said the focus was on pornographers who produced
"the worst material, the largest quantity of material, [for] the larg-
6 Gonzales, supra note 5 ("I want you to remember that this Department has an
obligation to protect not only our children, but all citizens, from obscenity.").
7 Garfield, supra note 2 ("President Bush's 2005 budget proposes four million
dollars in new funds for obscenity prosecutions.").
8 Julie Kay, U.S. Attorney's Porn Fight Gets Bad Reviews, DAILY Bus. REv., Aug. 29,
2005, at Al, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 125318960389.
9 Gellman, supra note 4 ("Christian conservatives . .. greeted the pornography
initiative with what the Family Research Council called 'a growing sense of confidence
in our new attorney general.'").
10 Kay, supra note 8 ("The agents were stunned to learn that a top prosecutorial
priority of Acosta and the Department of Justice was... obscenity. Not pornography
involving children, but pornographic material featuring consenting adults.").
11 Id.
12 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
13 "Extremely graphic or explicit." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 799 (4th
ed. 1994). "Hard-core" and "soft-core" are terms adopted by producers and consum-
ers of pornography to differentiate between materials that depict actual sexual acts or
aroused genitalia and materials that only show nudity or simulated sex. The hard-
core/soft-core distinction was also once thought to mark the line between obscenity
and protected speech. Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 2004 NEW ATLANTis 75, 80.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court established a standard that allows producers of hard-
core films to escape prosecution if their materials have "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value," the distinction has lost its legal significance, although it re-
tains a rhetorical one. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
14 William Triplett, Moral Majority: House, Bush on Indecency Crusade, VARIETY, Feb.
17, 2005, at 14, available at http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=print-story&
articleid=VR11 17918112&categoryid=18.
15 60 Minutes: Porn in the U.S.A. (CBS television broadcast Sept. 5, 2004) (transcript
on file with the New York City Law Review). See Porn in the U.S.A., Steve Kroft Re-




est area of distribution" 6 and that the defendants, Rob Black and
Lizzie Borden, were selected for their especial outrageousness in
flouting obscenity laws. 7 If convicted on all charges, the defend-
ants would face fifty years in prison."'
Extreme Associates moved to dismiss, but instead of using a
traditional First Amendment argument, 9 they wove an ingenious
Due Process Clause 20 claim out of two doctrinal sources: Stanley v.
Georgia21 and Lawrence v. Texas.22 The District Court for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the defendants and found
that the statutes, as applied to them, violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 23 The case garnered immediate
attention and was variously denigrated as the height of judicial ac-
tivism, 24 lauded as a victory for liberty on the scale of Roe v. Wade,
25
16 Id.
17 Id. See infra Part IV. A typical profile of Lizzie Borden reads, "[D]uring her five-
year career as an actress/director, Borden has emerged as a porn powerhouse who
manages to offend, disgust and/or alienate not just feminists, politicians and most
Americans with a conscience, but a great percentage of the unshockable pornography
industry as well .... In fact, Borden's films are so repugnant and evil that it's difficult
to justify their existence, let alone comprehend why anyone-especially a woman-
would want to make this kind of garbage in the first place." Janelle Brown, Porn Provo-
cateur, SALON, June 20, 2002, http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/06/20/
lizzyborden/index.html.
18 See Garfield, supra note 2.
19 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "The Government shall make no law abridging the free-
dom of speech .. . ." The traditional argument used by producers of pornography is
that the government infringes upon their freedom of speech when it sanctions speech
that is not obscene and, therefore, should be protected. See, e.g., Tipp-It v. Conboy,
596 N.W.2d 304 (Neb. 1999); State v. Midwest Pride IV, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[nor shall any person] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Substantive due
process-whereby government is restrained from depriving an individual of rights
interpreted as life, liberty, or property interests-has been developed primarily under
the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 166 (1973). The Supreme Court has incorporated the substantive due pro-
cess restraint to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
21 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
22 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 593 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
24 Karl Rove, Deputy Chief of Staff, White House, The Federalist Society Speech:
AgainstJudicial Imperialism (Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/
?id=l 1007537.
25 See Clyde DeWitt, What Will Happen to Obscenity Prosecutions? The Extreme Associ-
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and thought to signal the end of obscenity law as we know it.2 6 In
December 2005, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, ad-
monishing it for departing from the well-trod path of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence and remanded the case for consideration
under that doctrine. 27 After being denied a rehearing en banc,
defendants' attorneys Louis Sirkin and Jennifer Kinsley petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari and were denied in May 2006.28
Extreme Associates represents the battles we can expect if ob-
scenity prosecutions are revived. The obscenity doctrine author-
izes the most conservative communities in the United States,
guided by prosecutors, to decide whose sexuality is healthy and
whose is criminally deviant.29 Rob Black and Lizzie Borden, the
owners of Extreme Associates, were the perfect defendants to pros-
ecute under this standard: The loudest and crassest of
pornographers, their films challenge even the norms of the sex in-
dustry. Still, the district court recognized their products as part of
the consensual, adult, and private sex lives of their consumers and
therefore as protected from government intrusion." This surpris-
ing ruling must be understood as a product of a post-Lawrence v.
Texas legal world, and it reflects the recognition and acceptance of
sexual diversity Lawrence represented. It also must be understood
in the context of a world transformed by the Internet, where a uni-
verse of pornography is accessible to the most isolated farmer with
a computer, making an absurdity of the community-standards ap-
proach to First Amendment doctrine. No matter how fervently
26 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Vulgarians at the Gate: Privacy, Pornography
and the End of Obscenity Law As We Know It, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 427 (2005).
27 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
28 Id. H. Louis Sirkin, the defendants' attorney, was originally optimistic about the
case's chances at the Supreme Court: "They said we had the right to bring the issue,
and that puts us way ahead of the game. The important thing is having won it in the
district court, because we can now go forward with our appeals . . .without having
exposed our client to the danger of what potentially could happen in a trial." Mark
Kernes, Black Back Under Attack: Extreme Charges Reinstated, AVN (Jan. 1, 2006), http://
www.avn.com/index.php?Primary-Navigation=legal&Action=view.Article&Content_
ID=253686.
29 As will be explored at length, the standard for obscenity is
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted).
30 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 592-93 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
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conservative forces wish it, a doctrine that jails people for private
sexual expression is repulsive to our current appreciation for sex-
ual autonomy." Although Extreme Associates is lost, the Supreme
Court must face these inexorable changes and devise a new inter-
face between sexual expression and the law. The doctrine of sub-
stantive due process-which protects the individual right to
personal autonomy through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments-is a good place to start.
This Article begins with a short review of the obscenity doc-
trine under the First Amendment and the privacy doctrine under
substantive due process. Parts II and III present the district court
and Third Circuit opinions, respectively. Part IV tests the strength
of the district court opinion by revisiting the holdings of Lawrence
and Stanley. Part V argues that the Third Circuit, in reversing the
district court, both misapplied stare decisis principles and missed
an opportunity to address the failings of the obscenity doctrine.
Part VI explores why this doctrine no longer makes sense for our
time. Part VII encourages pornography producers and consumers
called before the courts32 to argue for a substantive due process
analysis grounded in the personal autonomy interests actually at
stake in their prosecutions. The article concludes by imagining
what might develop if the obscenity doctrine were dismantled and
porn performers were allowed a say in how the law impacts their
lives.
I. Two DOCTRINES, ONE RIGHT?
Extreme Associates employed two doctrines-the obscenity
doctrine under the First Amendment and the privacy doctrine
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause-to argue that
its customers are entitled to its products. 3  This section will pro-
vide a brief introduction to these two doctrines and to the contro-
31 Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 434 (suggesting that the mainstreaming of
pornography led to the district court's decision in Extreme Associates).
32 In May 2005, there were twenty obscenity prosecutions pending across the
United States. Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 448. Syracuse University's Trans-
actional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) is an independent, non-partisan or-
ganization that compiles reports about federal enforcement, staffing, and spending.
According to a TRAC report, despite increased agency staffing, federal prosecutions
have dropped across-the-board-except in the area of pornography. Pornography
prosecutions have experienced an eight-fold increase in the past ten years. TRANSAC-
TIONAL RECORDs AcCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 2006 TRAC FBI REPORT (2006), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracfbi/newfindings/current/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
T3 352 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
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versial U.S. Supreme Court cases relied upon by Extreme
Associates in the district court case.
A. The Due Process Clause and Sexual Privacy
Although it is articulated nowhere in the Constitution, privacy
has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a constitutional
right for two reasons. First, it is a fundamental right, older than
the constitution, that the court should uphold as a part of liberty.
3 4
Second, privacy is necessary to give effect to rights articulated in
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments; therefore, the Court finds it is rooted in the penumbras of
those Amendments. 35 The Court has held the right to privacy to
be a fundamental right under the liberty protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses,36 which state that
"[no person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." 7 When a right is asserted under the Fifth
Amendment, the court first determines whether it is fundamental,
by asking if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. '38 If the
court answers these questions in the affirmative, the right is funda-
mental, and any infringement must pass strict scrutiny analysis." If
the court answers in the negative, the right is not fundamental, and
its infringement must only be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest.4 ° Through this analysis, a fundamental right to
privacy has been found within certain relationships, such as mar-
riage and family; in certain acts, such as child-rearing and procrea-
tion; and in certain places, such as the home.41
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court first addressed privacy
34 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
35 Id. at 484. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (citing Griswold's concept
of penumbras). Griswold is an oft-cited source for the proposition that privacy is part
of the penumbra of liberty. Yet, Griswold cites Douglas's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), which in turn cites NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), for the idea that other rights emanated from and gave effect
to the guarantee of liberty in the Due Process clause.
36 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
38 Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 703, 721 (1997).
39 Id. at 721.
40 Id. at 728.
41 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; see generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557




rights in relation to sexual activity, finding that married couples
had a right to use contraceptives.4 2 The Court overturned a statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives, holding that both
the marriage relationship and the marriage bed are protected, pri-
vate realms. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court expanded Griswold's
right to use contraceptives, reasoning that the Equal Protection
Clause mandated that it include non-married persons.44 And in
Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized the limited but fundamental
right of a woman to make the decision to end her pregnancy.45
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court's most recent treatment of sexual
privacy, held that a statute criminalizing sodomy violated the de-
fendants' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.46 This opinion began with a re-telling of the history of the
privacy doctrine, paying special attention to those cases laying the
foundation for sexual privacy. 7 The Court then reconsidered Bow-
ers v. Hardwick,a" which had upheld a similar sodomy statute seven-
teen years earlier. According to the Court, Bowers had framed the
issue too narrowly, ignoring the important role sexuality plays in
relationships and the devastating impact such a statute could have
on the lives of homosexuals. 4' The Court found that its previous
decision had overlooked the central issue: Private consensual sex-
ual conduct was criminalized by this statute. 50 Bowers was also
based on a fictionalized history of such sodomy statutes5' and an
imagined consensus among the states 5 2-and Western civilization
as a whole 5 3-that homosexual conduct is wrong and can be
42 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
43 Id.
44 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454.
45 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
46 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
47 Id. at 564-65.
48 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure,
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penal-
ties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home.").
50 Id.
51 Id. at 567-70 ("'Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.' ... [I~t
should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed
at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.") (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192)).
52 Id. at 570-71 ("It was not until the 1970[ ]s that any State singled out same-sex
relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done so.").
53 Id. at 571-73 ("'Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.' ...
[S]cholarship casts some doubt on the sweeping nature of the statement . . . as it
20061
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criminalized. The Court emphasized that, while it may be true that
"for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homo-
sexual conduct as immoral . . [t]he issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law."54 The Court in
Lawrence decided that the state could not justify this criminal stat-
ute prohibiting private consensual conduct based solely on en-
forcement of a moral code,55 thereby overruling Bowers.5 6
Justice Kennedy's sweeping language about the scope of lib-
erty and the dignity of homosexual persons at first energized the
gay rights movement.57 Sadly, Lawrence proved to be more bark
than bite; plaintiffs have had trouble using it to expand the rights
of sexual minorities5" or even to invalidate other sodomy statutes.59
Williams v. Alabama, an Eleventh Circuit case upholding convic-
tions under obscenity laws for the sale of sex toys, is an example of
Lawrence's limits. 60 The court looked not at Lawrence's rhetoric, but
at which substantive due process analysis it actually applied.6' In
substantive due process jurisprudence, there are two different stan-
dards to which a court can hold the statute in question: rational
basis review if the statute does not infringe a fundamental right,
and strict scrutiny if it does.62 The Eleventh Circuit found that the
Supreme Court did not use strict scrutiny to analyze the infringe-
ment of the right in Lawrence and therefore held that Lawrence
could not have established a broad right to sexual privacy.63 The
pertains to private homosexual conduct between consenting adults.") (quoting Bow-
ers, 478 U.S. at 196).
54 Id. at 571.
55 Id. ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.") (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
56 Id. at 577-78.
57 John G. Culhane, "Lawrence-ium": The Densest Known Substance? 11 WIDENER L.
Rzv. 259, 259-60 (2005).
58 See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that Lawrence does not expand the right of homosexuals to adopt
children); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that Law-
rence does not make the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional). But see Goodridge
v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (using Lawrence to hold that
excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage is unconstitutional).
59 See Tjan v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 669, 703 (Va. App. 2005) (holding that
defendant did not have standing to challenge a "Crimes Against Nature" statute that
criminalized private consensual sodomy as facially unconstitutional because he had
engaged in public sex).
60 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
61 Id. at 1236.
62 Id.
63 Id. Which substantive due process analysis Lawrence applied is thought by many
to answer whether it found a fundamental right in that liberty. Because Lawrence
162 [Vol. 10:155
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court held that the narrower right to use sex toys is neither "deeply
rooted" nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and re-
manded the case to the lower court to decide whether the prohibi-
tion survives rational basis scrutiny.6 4 The dissent argued that a
right to sexual privacy pre-existed and was affirmed by Lawrence,
citing language that makes clear the Lawrence Court's placement of
intimate relationships within the scope of liberty.65 Williams illus-
trates the confusing hand that Lawrence has dealt both advocates
and opponents of sexual liberty.
In Extreme Associates, the district court takes up this hand and
plays it well: On substantive due process grounds, the court found
the obscenity statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendants,
even though comparable statutes have been upheld for decades
almost exclusively under the First Amendment.66 The following
section will briefly summarize the doctrine dealing with obscene
pornography under the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment and Obscenity
The text of the First Amendment unequivocally protects an
individual's right to speak without fear of government sanction by
stating "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech." '6 7 Unsurprisingly, 200 years of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence have narrowed, qualified, and categorized speech, making
that text only a starting point for deciding what protections from
governmental intrusion particular instances of speech are af-
forded. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court remarked that
certain categories of speech, including "the lewd and [the] ob-
never calls the right at issue "fundamental," while at the same time eulogizing the
essential importance of the right to liberty and autonomy, this determination is diffi-
cult, and this weakness is often noted. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816 ("We are particularly
hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from [Lawrence], whose language
and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental-rights analysis."). But see
Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116-17 (2004).
Hunter argues that the lack of fundamental-rights analysis resulted from the opin-
ion's "decisional structure," which entailed first asking whether the government had
succeeded in justifying the law with even a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1117. Since
the government failed to meet this minimum threshold, the Court did not need to
reach the question of whether the right was fundamental; the law could not pass even
rational-basis scrutiny. Id. at 1116. Hunter also points out that the Court's pervasive
characterization of the right at stake as equal in importance to other liberty interests
makes this question largely technical. Id. at 1117.
64 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238 n.9.
65 Id. at 1254 (BarkettJ., dissenting).
66 See infra notes 70-71, 75, 77.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2006]
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scene," have so little social value that their prohibition or regula-
tion does not even trigger First Amendment analysis.6 8 Although
Chaplinsky did not concern obscenity, the Court seized on this
phrase of dicta in a subsequent case, Roth v. United States.69 In Roth,
the Court created a new categorical exclusion from First Amend-
ment protection 70 and spawned an obscenity doctrine it has since
called "somewhat tortured."'7
The Court has struggled to define the parameters of obscenity.
Roth vaguely delineated obscenity as material that appeals to the
"prurient interest" in sex and that goes beyond "customary limits"
in describing sexual activity, giving the state broad powers to regu-
late without constitutional review.7 2 A decade later, in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, a plurality held that the First Amendment should ap-
ply to materials that appeal to the prurient interest in sex, unless
the material is "utterly without redeeming social value."73 After
that opinion, the weight of the Court was against finding materials
obscene and for protecting pornography as speech.7 4
Soon after Memoirs, the Supreme Court decided Stanley v. Geor-
gia, invalidating a statute that criminalized an individual's private
possession of obscenity.75 The Court conceded that the materials
involved were obscene, but held that First Amendment protection
should nevertheless apply.7 6 The government's interest in prevent-
ing public distribution of obscenity, implicated by the distributors
and producers in Roth,7 7 was inapplicable to a case of private pos-
session.7" The Court held that the First Amendment right to re-
ceive information, regardless of its social worth, was "fundamental
68 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
69 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
70 Id. at 485.
71 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (plurality opinion).
72 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488 n.20.
73 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion). The plurality articulates the fol-
lowing standard: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." Id.
74 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 n.3, for a review of these cases.
75 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
76 Id. at 568.
77 Id. at 560-61.
78 Id. at 563-64. One scholar notes that Roth's exclusion of obscenity from First
Amendment protection was actually based on that material's lack of social worth, not
on its public availability. Therefore, Stanley's distinction between the right to publish
and the right to receive information "arguably cut Roth loose from its moorings." Ar-




to our free society," and this right was buttressed here by the "also
fundamental" Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in one's
own home.79 The Court found that the government's justifications
for the obscenity statutes could not outweigh the plaintiff's rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.80
Stanley's significance was doomed to pale, and the Court nar-
rowed its holding in three subsequent cases, holding that Stanley
could never apply to obscenity found outside of the home.8' The
Court then refocused on defining obscenity in Miller v. California.82
Returning to the logic of Roth, it held that speech can be constitu-
tionally regulated, prohibited, or criminalized if it is obscene.8
Miller made the issue of whether material is obscene a question for
the jury, who should ask:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value.
84
Although this standard resembles the one established in Memoirs,
there are sharp distinctions. By making the definition of obscenity
an issue of fact, the Court eliminated the judicial subjectivity that it
saw plaguing obscenity decisions.85 By making the third prong
more rigid, the Court effectively established a presumption against
obscenity having social value. This standard and method remain
the law today.86
Although the Miller test is a potent weapon against obscenity,
prosecutors and courts do not always choose to wield it. In fact,
79 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
80 Id. at 565.
81 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971); United States v. Orito 413 U.S. 139, 143
(1973).
82 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
83 Loewy, supra note 78, at 24.
84 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
85 Id. at 22 n.3 (arguing that the Court had been "in the role of an unreviewable
board of censorship for the 50 States"). However, some argue that foisting the deci-
sion off on juries only compounds the law's vagueness and increases the danger of
subjectivity by assuming that obscenity is as "recognizable among other speech as
poison ivy is among plants." Loewy, supra note 78, at 24 (noting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
86 Loewy, supra note 78, at 24.
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until Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General,8 7 obscenity had
been "out of style" as a subject for federal prosecution since the
Reagan era.88 It was virtually untouched in the 1990s, as the Execu-
tive Branch focused its powers elsewhere.89 The Clinton Adminis-
tration declined to prosecute obscenity, and even conservative
Attorney General John Ashcroft had other priorities after Septem-
ber 11th. 90 The adult-entertainment industry took this apathy as
opportunity, flowering into a multi-billion dollar enterprise9 '
whose profiteers include General Motors, ComCast, Rupert Mur-
doch, Time Warner, and most large hotel chains.92 Help from new
technologies like the VCR and the Internet has made pornography
a more accepted part of our private lives and popular culture.93
Since the standards for obscenity are so vague and subjective, the
threat of obscenity prosecutions hangs over all members of this for-
midable enterprise.94 Extreme Associates' success in the district
87 President Bush swore in Alberto Gonzales as the eightieth Attorney General of
the United States on February 14, 2005. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary,
President Thanks Attorney General Gonzales at Swearing-In Ceremony (Feb. 14,
2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO5/O2/20050214-2.html.
88 Gellman, supra note 4.
89 See Loewy, supra note 78, at 26.
90 Kay, supra note 8. While obscenity prosecutions lay dormant, Washington made
efforts to regulate porn on other fronts, notably through the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003,
S. 151, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003), which restricted judges to minimum prison sentences
in obscenity convictions, and through 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2000), which targets "child
pornography" by requiring producers to list their addresses and be ready to furnish
proof of their models' ages. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, which
attempted to restrict Internet content to that suitable for children, was introduced in
1998 and passed in December 2006. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6501-6505 (West 2006).
91 60 Minutes, supra note 15. ("It is estimated that Americans now spend some-
where around $10 billion a year on adult entertainment .... The porn world now
has all the trappings of a legitimate industry with considerable economic clout.").
92 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH.J. INT'L L. 993, 995
n.9 (2005). See also Timothy Egan, Technology Sent Wall Street into Market for Pornogra-
phy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al. Egan also cites AT&T, EchoStar, Liberty Media,
Marriott International, Hilton, On Command, and the News Corporation as stake-
holders in the pornography industry through their rarely mentioned but enormously
profitable pay-per-view businesses. "The General Motors Corporation, the world's
largest company, now sells more graphic sex films every year [through its subsidiary
DirecTV] than does Larry Flynt, owner of the Hustler empire." Id. Egan profiled one
small-town video-store owner who succeeded in being acquitted for obscenity by argu-
ing that enormous sales by legitimate corporations mean that pornography is not as
deviant as we think. Id.
93 60 Minutes, supra note 15.
94 The fear of a new round of prosecutions began when President Bush was first
elected. Paul Cambria, a prominent lawyer for members of the porn industry, circu-
lated a list of what to omit from films and film jackets in order to avoid prosecution
and conviction. See The Cambria List, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/porn/prosecuting/cambria.html. See also Frontline: American Porn
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court, then, was not just a victory for Rob Black and Lizzie Borden.
II. THE WARNING SHOT Is BLOCKED
On the district court level, the defendants were indicted
before a grand jury for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462, and
1465, which proscribe the use of the Internet for the transporta-
tion or delivery of obscene materials.95 The defendants filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutional as
applied to them. They conceded that their videos were obscene by
Milds "community standards,"96 but claimed that the statutes vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
97
Judge Lancaster's opinion granting defendants' motion began
with a detailed description of the Internet, its history, and its cur-
rent scope. 98 The court then turned to the uncontested facts about
Extreme Associates' website. 99 To access video clips and images on
the site, visitors must provide their name, address, and credit card,
which is billed monthly for membership or separately for each
video ordered. 00 As part of the prosecution, an investigator went
through this process, viewing clips involving urination, double pen-
etration, and gang bangs; and ordering three videos through the
mail.'01
The district court affirmed that the defendants validly asserted
third-party standing on behalf of their clients, citing a line of
landmark privacy cases for the proposition that a vendor purveying
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wbgh/pages/frontline/
shows/porn/etc/script.html. Sexuality-rights activists condemned the list as an at-
tempt to distance the "legitimate" pornography industry from the illegitimate one.
See Tristan Taoromino, Panic in Pornville, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 14, 2001, at 146; Mark
Cromer, Porn's Compassionate Conservatism, NATION, Feb. 26, 2001, at 25.
95 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
96 Id. at 585.
97 Id. at 586.
98 Id. at 580 ("The Internet is a decentralized, global medium of communication
that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world.").
99 Id. at 581. By extolling the achievements of the Internet in affording low-cost
global communication and then turning to how carefully these porn producers pro-
tected audiences from stumbling across their materials, the court effectively distin-
guished this context from the context in which the Miller standard was born. This
approach also follows in the tradition of Reno v. ACLU, an obscenity-related Supreme
Court case where Justice Stevens described the Internet's history at length from its
birth as a military prototype to the chatrooms, search engines, and cyber-communities
of today, concluding that "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought." 521 U.S. 844, 850-53 (1997).
100 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
101 Id. at 584.
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goods that the buyer has a fundamental right to possess can assert
third-party standing on behalf of that buyer. 10 2 The court then
maintained that, although there is no First Amendment right to
obscene speech, Stanley established a fundamental right to receive
information regardless of its social worth.1"3 According to the dis-
trict court, this Stanley right to view or receive obscenity in one's
own home rested both in the First Amendment and in the Four-
teenth Amendment.0 4 The court recalled that subsequent cases
asserting a right to distribute obscenity based on Stanley failed, but
those had been First Amendment challenges. 0 5 No controlling
case had been argued exclusively on the due process right to pri-
vacy.10 6 The district court then analyzed Lawrence v. Texas, finding
that, while it did not create a broad right to sexual privacy, it did
hold that the government cannot justify a criminal law impacting
sexual privacy by asserting that the acts it prohibits are immoral."0 7
The district court applied these doctrinal elements to the ob-
scenity statutes and to Extreme Associates' website, reaffirming that
Extreme Associates clients have a right to view obscenity under the
Due Process Clause.10 Because this fundamental right was denied
by the outright ban in the federal obscenity statutes, the Court rea-
soned that strict scrutiny should apply. Under strict scrutiny, the
government must assert a compelling interest to which the statutes
curtailing fundamental rights are narrowly tailored." 9 The govern-
ment offered two possible interests: the protection of unwitting
adults and the protection of minors.1 Although these interests
102 Id. at 587 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976); Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1977); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d
1232, 1234 n.3 (I1th Cir. 2004); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
Interestingly, the government did not contest the issue of third-party standing, id.,
although it would prove pivotal in the case. Had the First Amendment cases after
Stanley been argued on third-party standing, the courts may have resolved the issue
raised by the defendants in Extreme Associates much sooner.
103 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
104 Id. at 589.
105 Id. at 589-90.
106 Id. at 590. The Third Circuit took particular issue with this statement, asserting
that Stanley's progeny, particularly Orito and Paris Adult Theater, contain examples of
the Court addressing the concept of privacy in relation to defendants' First Amend-
ment Claims. United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
107 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
108 Id. at 592.
109 Id.
110 Id. The court noted that the government requested and was granted time to file
an additional brief asserting a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored, but
failed to do so. Id. In all of its briefs, the government argued that rational-basis re-
view should apply. Id.
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were certainly compelling to the court, the statutes were not nar-
rowly tailored to achieving them. They over-included the very web-
site at issue, which did not pose any risk to unwitting adults or
children. The website's screening mechanisms already effectively
guarded children from the material; these identical mechanisms
had been proffered by agency regulations as effective means of
screening."' In addition, the court observed, courts have held that
bans on material not suitable for children must provide exemp-
tions to adults in order to be constitutional. 1 2 The court found
that the website protected unwitting adults from exposure to its
content by requiring that they pay and consent to see the mate-
rial. " According to the court, the obvious failure of the statutes to
be narrowly tailored to these interests belied a truth about obscen-
ity laws: A complete ban, first and foremost, restricts adults who
want to see pornography from seeing it. A law criminalizing adult,
consensual, private sexual conduct could only have been enacted
in the interest of morality," 4 and after Lawrence, morality is not a
legitimate-let alone compelling-interest." 5 In a rare acknowl-
edgment of sexual autonomy, the district court held that the stat-
utes as applied were unconstitutional.
III. THE DEVIANT COURT IS CHASTISED
In a unanimous three-judge panel, the Third Circuit reversed
the district court," 6 holding that it should have upheld the ob-
111 Id. at 595. The court cited the Federal Communications Commission's regula-
tion dealing specifically with the transmission of "obscene" materials, saying that re-
quiring a credit card ensures that only adults enter the site. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (a) (2)
(2006).
112 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (citing, paradoxically, United States v.
Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), a case that upheld a rigid restriction on sexual
or nude material being available in public libraries, for the proposition that a restric-
tion is constitutional if it can be lifted by adults at their request).
113 Id. at 593. Extreme Associates' website includes an extensive warning page, in-
cluding such statements of affirmation that it is the viewers' right as adults to view
sexually explicit material and the models' and producers' right to produce it. It de-
mands that viewers enter their birth date and electronic signature, under penalty of
perjury, in an effort to comply with the Child Online Protection Act. It also includes
the company's address and real names of the owners, in an effort to comply with 18
U.S.C. § 2257.
114 See id. at 592-93 ("It cannot be seriously disputed that, historically, the govern-
ment's purpose in completely banning the distribution of sexually explicit obscene
material, including to consenting adults, was to uphold the community sense of
morality.").
115 Id. at 593.
116 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
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scenity statutes against attack, and its failure to do so was a violation
of stare decisis. 1 7 The Third Circuit first briefly described Ex-
treme Associates' operations, leaving out inflammatory descrip-
tions of their films, as the facts would prove to be only marginally
relevant." 8 The opinion then reviewed the district court reason-
ing: "[T]he District Court opined that [Stanley] 'represents a
unique intersection between the substantive due process clause's
protection of personal liberty and privacy and the First Amend-
ment's protection of an individual's right to receive, and consider,
[sic] information and ideas.""'" According to the Third Circuit,
the district court used Lawrence to undermine obscenity law, argu-
ing that it invalidated "the principal rationale undergirding the
federal statutes and the line of Supreme Court decisions upholding
them [:]" morality.12 °
After disparaging the district court's understanding of Law-
rence and Stanley, the Third Circuit framed the issue squarely on the
government's terms: How can the district court overturn statutes
that have been upheld for so long against constitutional attack?
1 2 1
While the district court had disregarded this question, the Third
Circuit found substance for it in the Agostini doctrine.122 Accord-
ing to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court in Agostini v. Felton1
2
1
and its predecessor Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. 12 articulated a principle to guide lower courts when they are
confronted by conflicting Supreme Court precedent. This princi-
ple recognizes that at times a Supreme Court case will contradict a
prior case without directly overruling it.125 In such cases, plaintiffs
may argue that the more recent case implies a shift in the reason-
ing of the Court, and lower courts are within their rights to discuss
this argument, preserving it for appeal.' 26 Lower courts, however,
do not have the authority to declare one Supreme Court case over-
ruled by another if the Supreme Court has not expressly declared
so itself. According to the Third Circuit, Agostini decreed that
lower courts "should follow the case which directly controls, leav-
117 Id. at 162.
118 Id. at 151.
119 Id. at 153 (quoting United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589
(W.D. Pa. 2005), rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006)).
120 Id. at 154.
121 Id. at 155.
122 Id. at 156.
123 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).
124 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
125 Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d at 156 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 238).
126 Id. at 156 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237-38).
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ing to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions."'
1 27
The Third Circuit reasoned that the district court violated this
principle by not deciding the case under the First Amendment. If
the line of First Amendment cases limiting Stanley controlled the
outcome, then the district court should have applied them, instead
of arguing that they are based on interests which are no longer
valid under Lawrence. The issue, then, was whether these post-Stan-
ley cases should have "directly controlled" Extreme Associates, or
whether there was some basis for distinguishing them. 1 28
The district court distinguished Stanley's progeny both on the
facts and on the use of law; the Third Circuit addressed each of
these distinctions in turn. First, the Third Circuit recalled that Su-
preme Court cases immediately following Stanley--Reidel,129 Thirty-
Seven Photographs, l 0 Orito,'3' and Twelve 200-Ft. Ree1' 32-all upheld
federal obscenity statutes by saying that there is no "correlative
right" to distribute pornography based on Stanley's right to own."'
The Third Circuit found no reason why this broad First Amend-
ment principle should not apply here. 34 Even if Stanley articulated
a separate substantive due process right to possess obscenity, the
Third Circuit reasoned that post-Stanley cases limited that right.
They mentioned privacy and ruled against the plaintiffs anyway, be-
cause that right was not triggered.135 Specifically, Orito held that
"no constitutionally protected privacy is involved" in the transport
of obscene material, 36 and Paris Adult Theater defined the privacy
right in Stanley as "restricted to a place, the home." 37 The other
doctrinal distinction-that these cases involved defendants assert-
ing their First Amendment right to distribute or transport obscen-
ity, not defendants asserting their clients' Fifth Amendment right
to privately own obscene material-did not trouble the Third Cir-
cuit."' 8 The district court should have applied the standard First
127 Id. at 155 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484).
128 Id. at 156.
129 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
130 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (plurality opinion).
131 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
132 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
133 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
134 Id. at 156-57.
135 Id. at 157.
136 Id. at 158 (quoting Orito, 413 U.S. at 143).
137 Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973)).
138 Id. at 159.
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Amendment analysis because these distinctions did not "negate the
binding precedential value of the [post-Stanley] cases."139
The Third Circuit asserted that at least one post-Stanley case
was not even factually distinguishable. 4 ° Extreme Associates ar-
gued that Twelve 200-Ft Reels and Thirty-Seven Photographs were based
on the government's heightened interest in regulation at the bor-
der. The Third Circuit conceded that this might have been the
case, but Orito could still provide binding precedent. 4 ' Extreme
Associates argued that Orito, the only post-Stanley case treating in-
terstate commerce in obscenity, was decided before the Internet
fundamentally transformed how that commerce takes place.
14 2
The Third Circuit was "satisfied," however, that the change was not
so profound since the Supreme Court had never recognized it; as
long as Internet commerce was still commerce, it could still be con-
stitutionally regulated by the federal government.143
The circuit court concluded that Extreme Associates should have
been controlled by the post-Stanley cases, rather than by Stanley it-
self.'4 4 By using Lawrence to fashion a due process right to receive
obscenity, the district court impermissibly implied that Lawrence
overruled these obscenity cases. The Third Circuit ended its analy-
sis without considering the implications that Lawrence and the In-
ternet may have for obscenity laws. It left that privilege to the
Supreme Court. 45
IV. AN ALLIANCE OF OUTLIERS
There's a certain kind of "pro-wrestling" way of advertising yourself,
where you get up, and you have the chest-pounding, and the, "I'm
gonna get in the ring' You're going down!" I think Extreme Associates
took that chest-pounding and applied it to porn, and then applied it to
television, and suddenly they were fucked. Suddenly everyone was tak-
ing them seriously who actually has the power to come in and shut us
down. 146
139 Id.
140 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
141 Id. at 160.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 161.
144 Id. at 160-61. "Extreme Associates correctly quotes dicta from Reno v. ACLU,
indicating that the Internet is 'a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide com-
munication.'" Id. at 160. However, "the Court thus far has not suggested that obscen-
ity law does not apply to the Internet or even that a new analytical path is necessary in
Internet cases." Id. at 160-61.
145 Id. at 162.
146 Interview with Lena Ramon, porn performer, in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Mar. 12, 2006)
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Extreme Associates made their name-and ultimately sealed
their fate-by being extreme. 4 7 Their videos contain-as con-
servative pundits and journalists never fail to point out-simulated
rape, suffocation, urination, anal penetration, women having sex
with many men in sequence, and adults pretending to be chil-
dren.14 Their products may be outside even the porn industry's
community standards. Scholars Clay Calvert and Robert D. Rich-
ards quote Paul Cambria, a renowned obscenity defense lawyer, as
saying "I don't think that guys like Rob Black and Extreme Associ-
ates are the ones that should be fighting the battle of free speech
in the adult fields.. - 4" Cambria would probably prefer compa-
nies like Vivid Video, which last year garnered a billion dollars in
sales and has been described as the "porn industry equivalent of
Paramount," to lead the fight to establish pornography's
legitimacy.
1 50
However, as Calvert and Richards argue, it often takes an ex-
tremist to enlarge the boundaries of liberty for everyone. 5 ' Ex-
treme Associates has aligned itself with two other marginalized
extremists, the cases of Stanley and Lawrence. Both of these cases
promised to expand protected liberty to include sexual expression,
and both have been so limited by subsequent cases that their foot-
(on file with the Author). Lena Ramon has been in over 800 pornography films dur-
ing her career and has performed with Extreme Associates in over fourteen of them.
"I loved working for Extreme," Ramon said. "I had a scene at Extreme the evening a
Nightline episode profiling Extreme aired, and the guy from their office came running
in and said, 'Oh my god, in the half-hour after it aired, we got 75,000 hits on the
website!' It was great advertising-too bad they're going to jail because it worked so
well." Id.
147 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 2.
148 See, e.g., Rove, supra note 24.
149 Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Adult Entertainment and the First Amendment: A
Dialogue and Analysis with the Industry's Leading Litigator & Appellate Advocate, 6 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAc. 147, 158 (2004).
150 60 Minutes, supra note 15. Lena Ramon had a different perspective on the in-
sider/outlier structure of the porn industry:
I think of it like this: There is the Metropolis, the "hard-core" of main-
stream porn who hire only the very beautiful, very young, blond and
Asian women. Then there's all the rest of us, out here in the suburbs.
Plotting revolution; engaging in anarchy. Once you get out here-I'm
not even sure where to start because it is so diverse. There are people of
every race, every body type, every sexuality and gender orientation, as
you would know if you are familiar with Internet porn. I have worked
with people with Ph.D.s; people have all sorts of reasons for being in it.
What makes it so fabulous is that you can do anything you want, and you
can find people who, not only will they not condemn you, but they'll
say, "Yeah, let's do it! That's a great idea!"
Ramon, supra note 146.
151 Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 437.
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ing is precarious. 152 Still, neither has been overruled. Putting
aside for a moment the Third Circuit's stare decisis argument, it is
crucial to understand how the district court uses Lawrence and Stan-
ley and whether a fair reading of each supports such use.
A. The District Court's Use of Stanley
The district court in Extreme Associates quotes compelling lan-
guage from Stanley: Allowing the government to criminalize posses-
sion of obscenity would lead to the dangerous conclusion that "the
State has the right to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts." '53 However, the district court use of Stanley is narrower.
Stanley recognized a fundamental right to receive speech in the pri-
vacy of one's home, regardless of its social worth.1 5 4 This right is
constitutionally supported by the First Amendment-because it is
about expression and ideas-and by the Due Process Clause-be-
cause it is about personal privacy. The district court only uses Stan-
ley for its framing of the right to possess obscenity as a substantive
due process right.155
However, Stanley itself warned future plaintiffs that, although
they may have the right to possess obscenity, the government re-
tained the power to prosecute purveyors of obscenity. 156 In United
States v. Reidel, a purveyor of obscenity tried to use Stanley to defend
against an indictment. 157 The Court held that the plaintiff could
not "extrapolate" a right to sell and mail obscenity from Stanley's
right to private possession.1 5' The Third Circuit held that this was
exactly what Extreme Associates attempted to do, but there is a
crucial difference.' 59  Reidel stood "squarely on a claimed First
Amendment right to do business in obscenity and use the mails in
the process," 6 ' whereas Extreme Associates asserted the privacy
152 Although this may be a harder assertion to make for Lawrence given its recent-
ness, it is clear that the case has not lived up to the potential envisioned by LGBT
activists. See supra notes 58-65.
153 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
154 Id. at 592 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969)).
155 Id. at 586 ("Because we find that the federal obscenity statutes place a burden
on the exercise of the fundamental rights of liberty, privacy and speech recognized by
the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia, we have applied the strict scrutiny test.").
156 394 U.S. at 568.
157 402 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1971).
158 Id. at 355.
159 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
160 402 U.S. at 356.
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rights of its clients as a third party.' 6 ' The district court carefully
articulated that the requirements of third-party standing were met
in Extreme Associates, although the parties did not include this dis-
cussion in their briefs. 6 2 The court cited Craig v. Boren163 and Ca-
rey v. Population Services International,164 both decided after Reidel,
for the proposition that purveyors of a product that consumers
have a constitutional right to possess can challenge a statute that
regulates distribution of that product.165 The court also cleverly
cited the recent Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama decision,
where the Eleventh Circuit did not contest third-party standing, al-
though it denied a very similar motion to dismiss an obscenity
charge based on a different reading of Lawrence.166 The court ef-
fectively distinguished its holding from cases such as Reidel.
However, Stanley has been limited in other ways. In United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Court held that obscene mate-
rials discovered at a port of entry in a routine customs baggage
check may be confiscated even if they are intended for private
use.1 67 In United States v. Orito, the Court found similarly that trans-
portation of obscene materials intended for private use can be pro-
hibited, "negat[ing] the idea that some zone of constitutionally
protected privacy follows such material when it is moved outside
the home area." '168 Justice Stewart dissented from the Thirty-Seven
Photographs plurality, claiming that this conclusion cannot be ar-
rived at without overruling Stanley 69 because Stanley framed the
privacy interest as one an individual has in her own thoughts and
feelings, 7 ° which obviously travel with her. However, as the doc-
trine now stands, as soon as obscenity travels outside the home, it
loses the protections of Stanley.'
7'
The district court asserted that these cases were not control-
161 Extreme Assocs., 431 F. 3d at 153.
162 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
163 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
164 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
165 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
166 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004).
167 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality opinion).
168 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973).
169 Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 379 (Stewart, J., concurring).
170 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
171 Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 379 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Black
predicted this eventuality when he quipped "perhaps in the future [Stanley] will be
recognized as good law only when a man writes salacious books in his attic, prints
them in his basement, and reads them in his living room." Id. at 382 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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ling because they were brought on First Amendment grounds, im-
plying that they limit Stanley as to the First Amendment but not as
to the Fifth.'7 2 This distinction reinforces an ever-present theme in
the opinion of absolute separation between the First and Fifth
Amendment doctrines. But the court also offered an alternative
argument, reasoning that the cases are distinguishable: Thirty-Seven
Photographs because it is about the government's right of access
under customs law and Orito because it may be overruled by
Lawrence. '73
One scholar claimed that the district court executed an "end-
run" around these post-Stanley cases and predicted correctly that it
would be overturned for its audacity.' 74 However, all of these
1970s cases are arguably distinguishable on their facts as they do
not contemplate instantaneous and private transmission of materi-
als over the Internet. In the world in which Orito and Thirty-Seven
Photographs were decided, the distinction between outside and in-
side the home was rational: Materials found outside were in com-
merce, which Congress has power to regulate, and materials found
inside the home, which is protected against intrusion, were in pri-
vate possession. The materials that Extreme Associates claims its
clients have the right to possess will not be confiscated at a border
or found in the trunk of a car on their way from producer to con-
sumer. They go from the possession of the purveyor to the posses-
sion of the consumer in a second, over an inscrutable path. The
question becomes whether this kind of commerce arouses the
same interest in "protecting the public commercial environment"
that justifies older regulations.'75
172 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589-90 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
173 Id. Presumably, if the appellate court does not believe that the doctrines should
be kept separate when applying Stanley, then this importation of Fifth Amendment
into First is valid.
174 Loewy, supra note 78, at 26.
175 "If obscenity law is to continue in new media, the standard involved must be
defined." Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law As an Alternative
to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 70 (2004). Many cri-
tiques of community standards take as their starting point the fact that the Internet
has fundamentally changed the way obscenity impacts the public sphere. See, e.g.,
Lawrence G. Walters & Clyde DeWitt, Obscenity in the Digital Age: The Re-evaluation of
Community Standards, 10 NExus 59, 63 (2005) (arguing that the Internet has not been
subject to the same level of government regulation generally because it is "not as
intrusive on the viewer or listener as is radio or television"). The Supreme Court
edged toward recognition of this fact in Reno, "[C] ommunications over the Internet
do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden.




Even if the Government can assert this interest in the context
of the Internet, it may not be valid after Lawrence.'76 The Orito
Court justified government regulation of obscenity through the
government's interest in morality, citing a host of seminal Com-
merce Clause cases where the government based its regulation of
drugs, prostitution, lotteries, and obscenity on preventing the
"spread of any evil," among other intangibles.' 77 The legitimacy of
this interest was unquestioned in that era, but Lawrence arguably
debunks it. District Judge Lancaster only mentions this possibility
before turning to the due process analysis,' but it is clear that the
advent of the Internet and Lawrence have possibly eroded obscenity
law under the First Amendment as well.
B. The District Court's Use of Lawrence
Although the defendants encouraged the court to find that
Lawrence stands for a fundamental right to sexual privacy, the dis-
trict court declined to do so; indeed, it did not need to do so.' 79
The substantive due process analysis rested on the fundamental
right articulated in Stanley, not that in Lawrence.""( The district
court used Lawrence only for the proposition that morality is "not
even a legitimate state interest that can justify infringing one's lib-
erty interest to engage in consensual sexual conduct in private.''
The court also did not assert that morality is invalidated as a legiti-
mate interest in general, but only in relation to an intrusion on pri-
vate, consensual, adult sexual expression, which includes the
behavior of watching obscene pornography. 82 By reading Law-
rence this narrowly, the district court sidestepped the pitfalls that
usually accompany Lawrence while staying true to its vision of valu-
ing the sexual autonomy interests at stake.
A comparison to Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama shows
how the district court used Lawrence differently from other courts
narrowing the precedent. 3 The defendants in Williams also
brought a substantive due process challenge to an obscenity law,
but one contending that Lawrence established a fundamental right
176 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
177 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 144 n.6 (1973).
178 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 589-90.
179 Id. at 589.
180 Id. at 591.
181 Id. at 593.
182 Id. at 591.
183 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004).
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to sexual privacy. 184 Only the dissent in Williams raised the alterna-
tive claim that morality is not a legitimate interest for regulating
even non-fundamental rights. 8 5 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed
this contention in a footnote, finding it difficult to believe that
"such a traditional and significant jurisprudential principle has
been jettisoned wholesale."'
18 6
Scholars and even Supreme Court justices have argued that
this is exactly what Lawrence has done. Justice Scalia's dissent in
Lawrence lambasted the majority for holding that morality is not a
legitimate state interest, and, in so doing, he outlined the potential
breadth of this holding.8 7 His parade of laws "called into ques-
tion" included adultery laws, obscenity laws, and the exclusion of
gays from the military; as well as laws against bestiality, incest, and
bigamy. 188 Scholars saw the jettisoning of some morals-based legis-
lation as a fortunate and logical consequence of Lawrence,i8 9 but
viewed Justice Scalia's fire-and-brimstone language as not sup-
ported by Lawrence or the cases he cited. 9 ' Most of these laws exist
to protect against more concrete harms, such as those to an animal
who cannot consent, to an injured spouse, or to the so-called unity
of the armed forces. However, the district court did not go as far as
Justice Scalia, or even as far as his critics, in its interpretation of
Lawrence. It did not claim that morality could no longer be a legiti-
mate interest for all laws, but only for those that criminalize private
consensual adult sexual expression.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1259 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 1238 n.8.
187 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice
Scalia chastized the Court for disrupting the lower courts' reliance on Bowers as prece-
dent to uphold laws that prohibited certain sexual acts for no other reason than pub-
lic morality. Id. Notably, one case Justice Scalia cited was an earlier version of
Williams. Id. at 589 (citing Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001)). In
his dissent to Williams, Judge Barkett cited Justice Scalia for the proposition that Law-
rence really did eliminate the government interest driving the sex toy laws, and there-
fore that a different result was required. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1259 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
188 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589-90.
189 See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893 (2004).
190 Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex and Limits
State Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSA L. REv. 95, 145-48
(2003). Allison argues that the Lawrence opinion may at least change the outcome in
the cases of sex toys and nude dancing if the government does not present any inter-
ests other than protecting morality. Id. at 147. Both are cases of obscenity prosecu-
tions, but according to Justice Scalia, the danger of Lawrence is that it eliminates
morality as a legitimate government interest across the constitutional board. See Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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V. STARE DECISIS OR COUP D'ETAT?
Instead of addressing the merits of the substantive due process
arguments made in district court, the Third Circuit focused on
whether the district court could rule on those arguments at all.
The Third Circuit employed an emphatic statement of the most
basic principle in our common law system-stare decisis 19 -to ar-
gue that the district court had no business agreeing with the de-
fendants' creative arguments, even if they were right. 9 2 A
principle just as fundamental to the common law, however, is
change.19 It is imperative, then, to decide whether the district
court actually stepped outside of its authority, or whether the
Third Circuit failed to comprehend that the legal and factual cir-
cumstances before it were truly new and untested. This Part will
explore this question and ask why the Third Circuit, with its fa-
mously pro-First Amendment bench,1 94 may have avoided address-
ing the merits of the arguments.
The Third Circuit invoked Agostini195 and Rodriguez de Quijas'9 6
as cases that govern how lower courts should deal with precedent
that seems to have been "implicitly overruled" by subsequent pre-
cedent of the same weight.'97 Circuit courts have often applied
191 "[L]ike cases should be decided alike in order to maintain stability and con-
tinuity in the law." 20 AM. JUR. 2D. Courts § 129 (2005).
192 See United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
193 One famous Justice set out the argument for change:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897),
quoted in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194 The Third Circuit garnered its reputation as friendly to free-speech plaintiffs
through cases like Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d
219 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006) (holding that law schools had the
First Amendment right to deny access to military recruiters who violated their anti-
discrimination policies). It has also acknowledged the difficulties Internet providers
face in conforming to 1970s obscenity doctrine and rled on behalf of the rights of
pornographers in the extensive litigation around the Child Online Protection Act.
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated, Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564
(2002); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), affd, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
Some speculated that the Attorney General's strategy to try Extreme Associates in the
conservative city of Pittsburgh would backfire if the case was appealed to the Third
Circuit. Calvert & Richards, supra note 26, at 444. Since the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, the Attorney General will have a chance to use that conservative jury after
all.
195 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
196 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
197 Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d at 156.
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these cases in reversing district court opinions for overstepping
their authority and engaging in speculation about the reasoning of
higher courts. 98 However, these cases usually involve a party di-
rectly claiming that a binding, precedential case should not apply
because its reasoning has been eroded by subsequent cases.' 99 In
Extreme Associates, the district court's central holding was not that
Lawrence overruled Miller-although many scholars would agree
with that statement-instead it was that the First Amendment anal-
ysis simply does not apply to this substantive due process claim.
The fundamental gap, then, between the Third Circuit and
district court is their differing views of the relationship between the
First and Fifth Amendments. The district court treated the sub-
stantive due process claim before it and saw no reason to "reach"
into the First Amendment for precedent, even though that was
where cases dealing with obscenity had usually been decided.2 ° °
The district court acknowledgment of the post-Stanley line of First
Amendment cases was secondary to its holding. The Third Circuit
saw the defendants' motion to overturn an obscenity indictment
and treated it under the obscenity doctrine, thereby not "reaching"
into a doctrine that was supposedly unrelated to obscenity. 20 1 If
one regards the First and Fifth Amendments as wholly separate ex-
cept in the unique case of Stanley, then the district court opinion is
a strict application of stare decisis. 20 2 Under substantive due pro-
cess, the defendants asserted the fundamental right established in
Stanley and questioned what interest would be served by infringing
that right after Lawrence. The obscenity cases were not applicable
198 United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 2005).
199 See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Bach does not distinguish
Presser. Rather, he contends that Presser is 'outdated' and 'do[es] not reflect the
Court's modem view.'"); United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir.
2005) ("Judge Barkett's theory for disregarding the direct application of Jones is that it
was implicitly overruled by the later decision in Dominguez Benitez, a premise based on
her belief that Jones rests on reasons rejected in Dominguez Benitez."); United States v.
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Singletary contends that the Supreme
Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence renders 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1), the
felon-in-possession statute, unconstitutional, and therefore, his conviction invalid.").
200 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006) ("Neither the
Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has considered a sub-
stantive due process challenge to the federal obscenity statutes .... ").
201 Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d at 156 ("[In the broadest and most obvious sense, the
Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly, in decisions rendered post-Stanley, up-
held the constitutionality of federal statutes regulating the distribution of
obscenity.").
202 Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
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because privacy rights were not asserted in those cases. 201 How-
ever, if one sees the two doctrines as interwoven-at least after
Stanley---then these cases were directly applicable, and the court's
refusal to apply them was an attack on the obscenity doctrine bol-
stered by Lawrence.
204
Even if the Third Circuit's understanding of the relationship
between the First and Fifth Amendments is more compelling, it
underestimated the singularity of this case. As the Third Circuit
acknowledged, factual distinctions alone could have made the
prior obscenity cases inapplicable and freed the district court to
hear a creative argument tying unique facts to the only relevant
law.20 5 None of the post-Stanley Supreme Court cases involved de-
fendants claiming third-party standing on behalf of their clients'
right to privacy.206 The fact that the privacy right in Stanley was not
properly asserted by any of these defendants does not mean that it
was not properly asserted in Extreme Associates. The district court
was defending the right of the individual to view obscene materials
on her computer in her home.20 7 If Stanley is still good law, it may
be the only case that directly governs these facts. By not applying
Stanley, the Third Circuit engaged in the same impermissible rea-
soning of which it accuses the district court: implying that a Su-
preme Court decision has been virtually overruled by subsequent
cases when the Supreme Court has never explicitly said as much.
By asserting the Agostini principle, the Third Circuit avoids
speaking its mind on the questions that it considers central:
Whether Lawrence overrules the obscenity doctrine by implication,
and whether the Internet has created a need for new law. It could
have used the opportunity differently, construed Lawrence as nar-
rowly as other courts have,208 or come to conclusions about the
203 Id.
204 Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d at 154.
205 Id. at 159.
206 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971) (holding that there is no First
Amendment right to distribute obscenity); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (holding that there is no First Amend-
ment right to transport obscenity); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
207 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 596 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006) ("We find that the
federal obscenity statutes burden an individual's fundamental right to possess, read,
observe and think about what he chooses in the privacy of his own home by com-
pletely banning the distribution of obscene materials."). In fact, none of the post-
Stanley, pre-Internet cases could have raised this claim in quite the same way as Extreme
Associates. Only in the Internet age can one reference a hypothetical third-party con-
sumer for whom obscene materials magically appear in the privacy of his home.
208 See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Internet that foreclosed such arguments for future plaintiffs. Per-
haps the Third Circuit intended to analogize this case to the situa-
tion in Agostini, wherein the Supreme Court-while asserting the
limits of lower courts' power-admitted that to adhere to its own
precedent in this case "would work a 'manifest injustice.'- 209 Agos-
tini is cited most often by federal courts for the principle that stare
decisis is "not an inexorable command."21 0 The Third Circuit also
cited itself in a case where it credited the lower court's reasoning,
even though it felt the obligation to reverse.21 a It is possible that
the Third Circuit considered the district court's position here simi-
larly worthy. By not considering the merits, the Third Circuit may
have shown a lack of courage, but it also pointed out issues with
which the Supreme Court will eventually have to contend. The fol-
lowing section will argue that Lawrence expresses-and the Internet
has wrought-societal changes that reveal the obscenity doctrine as
oppressive, illogical, and, finally, obsolete.
VI. A TYRANNY OF YOUR PEERS
A. "Prurient Interests" After Lawrence
The tragedy is that we are producing a product that is almost universally
consumed, and almost nobody is willing to stand up and support us. I
don't know why the majority of people feel like they have to put on some
moral act. You know they're on the websites just like everybody else, on
their computers in the dark.2 12
The district court opinion in Extreme Associates uses Lawrence
twice. In the main, it uses the principle that morality cannot be a
legitimate, let alone a compelling, interest in defending a law
prohibiting private consensual sexual activity against a Due Process
209 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460
U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983)).
210 Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 754 n.241 (2004);Julie E. Payne,
Abundant Dulcibus Vitiis, Justice Kennedy: In Lawrence v. Texas, an Eloquent and Overdue
Vindication of Civil Rights Inadvertently Reveals What Is Wrong with the Way the Rehnquist
Court Discusses Stare Decisis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 969, 975 (2004); Pintip Hompluem Dunn,
How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493,
519 (2003).
211 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 U.S. 2048 (2006) (citing United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001))
(holding that the court's previous decision-that felon-in-possession statutes were
constitutional exercises of Congress' commerce power-need not be reconsidered in
light of United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which plaintiffs contended un-
dermined the court's reasoning).
212 Ramon, supra note 146.
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Clause claim.21 3 It also mentions that by invalidating morality as a
government interest, Lawrence may undermine obscenity doctrine
"where it lives" in the First Amendment.214 The Third Circuit views
this second contention as the more central-and impermissible-
use of Lawrence. Treatments of Lawrence by constitutional scholars,
however, consistently support the idea that Lawrence, read narrowly
or broadly, at least "point[s] toward elimination of obscenity
law."' 215 This section will argue that the Miller standard is rooted in
the very morality interests invalidated in Lawrence and it will discuss
the idea of preventing "moral harm" and why that idea unsettles
activists on both sides of the obscenity debate-as well as the Su-
preme Court itself.
Miller asks a jury to apply the standards of its local community
and decide whether the material before it appeals to the "prurient
interest," meaning a "shameful or morbid interest," in sex.216 It
next asks whether the material is "patently offensive" to those com-
munity standards. Finally, it asks the jury to determine whether a
reasonable person could find serious value in the material, despite
its shameful appeal and patent offensiveness. 21 7 The jury is never
given a legal definition of what might be "shameful" or "offensive"
or what might have "value." The distinction between obscenity and
mere pornography, on which might hang a fifty-year jail sentence,
is made through the instinctual and unguided reaction of twelve
people representing a local community. The only possible descrip-
tion of the jury's role is as moral arbiter.
Professor Andrew Koppelman explains the important distinc-
tion between moral and tangible harms. 21' The Miller standard, as
justified in Paris Adult Theater, rests on the principle that "good
books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the
human personality, and develop character" while "obscene books
213 United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 593 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
rev'd, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 U.S. 2048 (2006).
214 Id. at 590.
215 Cenite, supra note 175, at 25. See also Tribe, supra note 189, at 1945 ("[T]he
Court's holding in Lawrence is hard to reconcile with retaining the state's authority to
ban the distribution to adults of sexually explicit materials ...... ); Gregory P.
Magarian, Substantive Due Process As a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical
Speech, 90 MINN. L. REv. 247, 307 (2005) ("[1]n light of Lawrence, the Supreme Court's
obscenity doctrine is untenable.").
216 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491, 497 (1985).
217 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
218 Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1635,
1636 (2005).
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.. have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact. 219
Obscenity laws are not reliant on the government interest in
preventing tangible harms that supposedly flow from obscenity,
such as violence to women, or supposedly inhere in its making,
such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. This explains
why the doctrine has not been successfully dismantled by critics
who show that obscenity does not actually result in these tangible
harms.2 2' Koppelman argues that the government's interest actu-
ally is in preventing moral harm, defined as harm to a viewer's
morals, regardless of consequences to her behavior and the outside
world.
The history of the obscenity doctrine demonstrates its roots in,
and commitment to, preventing this kind of internal moral harm.
In the nineteenth century, courts used the English common law
"bad tendency" test, defining obscenity as material tending "to de-
prave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences ... .,,221 Judge Learned Hand first advocated a "commu-
nity standards" approach, where "the word 'obscene' [would] indi-
cate the present critical point in the compromise between candor
and shame;" the consensus of the community as to what will cause
moral harm.222 The Supreme Court in Roth and Miller made Judge
Hand's "community standards" approach the law of the land. 223
While the approach was arguably adopted as a flexible test for ob-
scenity that would be allowed to change with the times-rather like
the standard for negligence-its acknowledged purpose is to pre-
vent viewers from being moved, for better or worse, by works that
have the public's disapproval.
Of each of the elements of the Miller test, only "prurient inter-
est" has been defined more specifically. Under this prong, the jury
must decide whether the material provokes a "good, old fashioned,
healthy" interest in sex or an abnormal one.224 If the material is
outlandish enough, the court may need to call expert witnesses to
explain the inclinations of whichever deviant sexual group for
which the material was made.225
219 Id. at 1640-41 (quoting Paris Adult Theater, 413 U.S. at 63).
220 Id. at 1636.
221 Cenite, supra note 175, at 30 (quoting Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360 (1868)).
222 Id. at 31 (quoting United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
223 Id. at 31-32.
224 Id. at 37 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985)).
225 The Court affirmed the wisdom of calling expert witnesses only "where con-
tested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the experience of
the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals."
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973).
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Lawrence's argument that the right to make private sexual deci-
sions is an integral safeguard of human liberty and dignity has obvi-
ous bearing here. 2 26 The obscenity doctrine requires the jury to
judge not only the material, but also its own responses to it and the
projected responses of others. 227 The jury members are asked if
the material appeals to that wrong part of themselves and their
neighbors. They are allowed, alternatively, to distance themselves
from the portrayal of "aberrant sexual activities" by deciding that,
although they would never find such filth stimulating, some devi-
ant sexual group may.2 28 Obscenity prosecutions allow the govern-
ment to attach criminal penalties to materials that cater to
abnormal desires, while protecting "good, old-fashioned, healthy"
pornography as free speech. The moral distinction between good
sexual desire and deviant sexual desire, especially made in a con-
text where all desires on the table are those of consenting adults,
begins to look startlingly like the moral distinction between homo-
sexual desire and heterosexual desire that Lawrence holds cannot
be the basis for criminal laws. The state must justify its laws on
tangible harms, not moral discrimination.
229
Before Lawrence, the Supreme Court had expressed its discom-
fort in justifying a prohibition on sexual speech solely on morality
in the famously confounding nude-dancing cases. 2 "0 The plurality
in Barnes v. Glen Theater upheld a prohibition on nude dancing
226 Tribe, supra note 189, at 1945 (" [T]he Court's holding in Lawrence is hard to
reconcile with retaining the state's authority to ban the distribution to adults of sexu-
ally explicit materials identified by, among other things, their supposed appeal to
what those in power regard as 'unhealthy' lust .... " (quoting Brockett, 472 U.S. at
504)).
227 "The focus of prurient appeal analysis is less on whether content has sexual
appeal than on whether that appeal is 'appropriate.' ... [Oinly 'shameful' responses
could be targeted for prosecution." Cenite, supra note 175, at 36-37.
228 Id. (citing Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303 (1978)).
229 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). The most well-known state-
ment of this principle predates Lawrence by more than a century:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised [sic] community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear be-
cause it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or rea-
soning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge University Press
1989) (1859).
230 See Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1108 (2005) (arguing that the confusing decisions on nude dancing
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based on the governmental interest in morality. 23 1 Souter, in a
concurring opinion, held that the prohibition should be upheld
"not on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views," but on the
"secondary effects" which result: promotion of prostitution, spread
of sexually transmitted disease, and decline in property values.232
Nine years later, the Court reversed Barnes with another plurality
opinion in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.23 3 This time, the slim majority
adopted Souter's "secondary effects" logic, downplaying the purely
moral interests. 234 After Lawrence, the Supreme Court's rejection
of morality as a government interest is clear, and the Court must
reckon with what this means for the obscenity doctrine generally.
Andrew Koppelman argues that even if preventing moral
harm was a compelling goal, the Miller standard reflects the "inevi-
table clumsiness" of any legal attempt to address such a subtle and
complex issue. 23 5 All literature influences moral development by
promoting a certain understanding of the way the world is or
should be. 236 For example, some pornography may promote self-
centeredness and objectification of others.237 However, any con-
demnation of this moral effect is complicated. Self-centeredness
and objectification may be a natural, even healthy part of the sex-
ual experience. 238 These attitudes are obviously not promoted
only by pornography, but by many aspects of our economy and cul-
ture. 239 However, obscenity laws only prohibit materials that are
sexual in nature.2 4 ° Moreover, which sexual materials are banned
and which are left alone reveal, in some cases at least, an interest
not in preventing objectification but promoting it. Playboy can
are a result of the Supreme Court's Freudian anxiety when confronted with the naked
female form).
231 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion).
232 Id. at 586.
233 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality opinion).
234 As Barnes based its "morality interests" on Bowers, some scholars argue it would
have been overruled by Lawrence had the Supreme Court not shifted its analysis.
Bradley J. Shafer & Andrea E. Adams, Jurisprudence of Doubt, 84 MIcl. B.J. 22, 25 n.9
(2005).
235 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1678.
236 Id. at 1643-44.
237 Id. at 1648-49. But see Leonore Tiefer, Some Harms to Women from Restrictions on
Sexually Related Expression, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 95, 99 (1993) (arguing that "you
cannot understand pornography's content or function on a literal level" because a
person's experience of a certain fantasy is coded in subconscious symbols, so that a
fantasy of sexual subjugation may provide a feeling of, and actually be about, sexual
empowerment).
238 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1650-51.




freely publish "soft-core" photographs of naked women of color,
portraying them in the text as "exotic beauties," and thus support a
dangerously objectifying and racist sexual script.241' As long as the
photographs do not contain sex acts, this magazine cannot be pros-
ecuted for obscenity. 24 2 Meanwhile, the Cambria List circulates the
porn industry, advising companies against portraying inter-racial
sex, female ejaculation, gay male sex, sado-masochism, and
transsexuals if they want to avoid prosecution. 43 There are argu-
ments to be made that a film, even an explicit film, about any of
these subjects could have an empowering effect, depending on the
viewer, the context, and the story told. Intentionally omitting these
subjects conveys a message that these acts and these people are
perverse and deviant. By censoring sexual speech, the government
fails at preventing moral harm and only succeeds in producing
shame 24 4-and shame is undoubtedly more to blame for "cor-
rupting and debasing" the human personality than pleasure ever
could be.245
241 Id. at 1656-57. Lena Ramon's experience exemplifies how subtle and literary
those moral scripts can be and therefore how unsuited to broad generalizations in the
law.
I generally won't do a rape scene. If the sense of the scene is making
me feel like "This is something bad that actually happens to women,"
then I won't do it. But usually all it requires is a slight change in the
script or the attitudes of the people working together. Since I'm usually
working with people I know and I have a very dominant personality
when I'm working, I can make those changes. For example, I was doing
this "home invasion" scene where my little white husband supposedly
owed the big black man money for drugs, and I end up having sex with
the drug-money guy. It started off as a weird, forced scene, but in the
middle of it I suddenly said "Wow, it's nice to have a real man around
the house!" It was creepy and weird, but to me, it was creepy and weird
to me in an okay, fantasy way. I've done abduction scenes that felt okay
to me. If I'm being totally honest about it then I think you have to
realize that, as a fantasy, it's really hot for a lot of people. I'm not being
hurt; I'm not being abducted; I'm not being raped. I'm working with
people I know, and it's all in good fun.
Ramon, supra note 146.
242 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1656-57.
243 See Taoromino, supra note 94; The Cambria List, supra note 94.
244 See Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1660-61. Professor Leonore Tiefer argues
that, since sexual fantasies are an almost universal part of people's psychological lives,
"protecting" women from pornography only results in increasing the shame that wo-
men feel for having such fantasies. Tiefer, supra note 237, at 97-100.
245 See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47
STAN. L. Rv. 661 (1994-95) (arguing that at least gay male pornography provides a
social good-helping gay men find "sexual integrity"-and that fighting for greater
acceptance of pornography of this nature is part of the fight to end homophobia and
misogyny).
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B. "Community standards" in the Age of the Internet
Actually, a lot of what people are willing to do is based on those amor-
phous community standards. Companies will refuse to sanction certain
acts out of a fear of prosecution, like fisting, sex while in bondage, cut-
ting or piercing. It's not because there's a law; it's not that the fisting
police are going to come and arrest you. It's out of a fear of violating
community standards. People who have artistic visions and want to do
something that they find really groundbreaking are not doing it because
they're afraid they're going to cross some obscenity line and go to jail.2 46
Allowing juries to judge the "patent offensiveness" and "pruri-
ent appeal" of pornography by "community standards" has served
two purposes in the past: It has allowed states and subdivisions of
states to set the tone for the speech in their communities, while
protecting the right of purveyors of pornography to find markets
for their products without offending more conservative communi-
ties and risking prosecution.247 In 1973, this standard may have
been a useful compromise that recognized " [i] t is neither realistic
nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requir-
ing that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept the public depic-
tion of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
2 4 8
Although there has been some lack of guidance as to the scope of
the relevant community-and confusion emitting from the Su-
preme Court's decision to enforce national standards with regard
to the law's third prong-the standard has persisted for thirty years
without serious contention. 249 Scholars now argue that the In-
ternet poses an entirely new challenge that cannot be met by ad-
justing laws meant for mail distribution, public movie houses, or
even television.250 It requires a complete overhaul, if not a rejec-
tion, of the obscenity doctrine.
The Internet has expanded the "community" to reach across
246 Ramon, supra note 146.
247 Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 62. See also Cenite, supra note 175, at 33.
248 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
249 Shafer & Adams, supra note 234, at 24. The Supreme Court leaves the scope of
the relevant community to state law for the first two prongs and enforces national
standards for the third. This means that in Michigan, for example, a jury will be
instructed to answer whether the average American could find "serious value" in the
material and whether the average Michigan resident would find it patently offensive
and appealing to the prurient interests. Id. If the materials are being evaluated in
reference to its suitability for minors, the jury will instead be instructed to ask whether
the average resident of their county would find it suitable. Id. at 25 n.32.
250 Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 60; Cenite, supra note 175, at 25; Shafer &
Adams, supra note 234, at 24; J. Todd Metcalf, Obscenity Prosecutions in Cyberspace: The




the globe; reduced it to the solitary individual in the privacy of her
home;25' and fostered specialized "communities" of like-minded
people who are free to establish their own standards and revel in
their own idiosyncrasies. 252 However this transition is portrayed, it
is at least clear that the Internet "community" is not geographically
bound.253 Even if they wanted to, Internet providers could hardly
impose geographical limitations on who can access their materials.
However, prosecutors can bring suit in any jurisdiction where ob-
scenity is created or received, and juries will apply the standards of
that community. 25 4 Because residents of a sleepy town in Missis-
sippi can now pay for and view the same pornography as New
Yorkers, the threat of a prosecution under Miller may reduce all of
the content available to that appropriate for the least tolerant com-
munity.255 Under the First Amendment, Internet providers can ar-
gue that this "lowest common denominator" effect chills speech
that might be protected were it in any other medium.
256
The Third Circuit and Supreme Court have begun to hint that
a "community standards" approach may be unworkable for the In-
ternet. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court considered the gov-
ernment's first attempt to regulate content on the Internet, the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which attempted to reduce
all Internet content to that appropriate for minors.257 The Court
unanimously found the Act to be unconstitutional because it af-
fected the non-obscene speech of adults and was not narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling interest. It also found the analogies the
government made to other obscenity laws unpersuasive because
zoning and other time, place, and manner restrictions are neither
251 As Rob Black said, "It's not involving the community. It's involving a private
individual, who purchased these videos, and downloaded the images from the In-
ternet into their home." 60 Minutes, supra note 15.
252 See Gyong Ho Kim & Anna R. Paddon, Cybercommunity Versus Geographical Commu-
nity Standard for Online Pornography: A Technological Hierarchy in Judging Cyberspace Ob-
scenity, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 65 (arguing that the relevant community
to judge whether material is obscene should be the cyber community who is exposed
to the material); see also Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 68-69.
253 Kim & Paddon, supra note 252, at 66.
254 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563, 602 (2002). In fact, Extreme Associates has been
cited as an example of a strategic choice in venue-by prosecuting where community
standards are most rigid. Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 64-65.
255 Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 65. The widespread availability of pornog-
raphy is most marked in, but not limited to, the context of the Internet. Large hotel
chains and satellite television also make pornography invisibly accessible to communi-
ties with the strictest standards, who, ironically enough, seem to buy it in higher num-
bers than urban residents. See Egan, supra note 94.
256 Walters & DeWitt, supra note 175, at 65.
257 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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effective nor even desirable in the context of the Internet. 258 The
Third Circuit considered the government's revision of CDA, the
Child Online Protection Act, and found its reliance on "commu-
nity standards" to be wholly inappropriate to the Internet. 259 The
Supreme Court subsequently overturned the Third Circuit, hold-
ing that the use of "community standards" did not, by itself, invali-
date the Act. 26 ° However, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity
to speculate that, "given Internet speakers' inability to control the
geographic location of their audience," crafting a national stan-
dard may be the only way to constitutionally regulate the In-
ternet.261 The Supreme Court went on to uphold a preliminary
injunction against the law-reengineered as COPA-on remand,
and the battle over this statute continues.2 6 2 Scholars have already
proposed replacements to the community-standards approach.
263
This simmering debate is a sign that the Internet challenges the
basic assumptions behind this test. The Supreme Court must even-
tually resolve the insurmountable burden a community standard
poses for speech on the Internet.
258 Id. at 867-68. ("According to the Government, the CDA is constitutional be-
cause it constitutes a sort of 'cyberzoning' on the Internet. But the CDA applies
broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace.").
259 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom., 535 U.S. 564
(2002). See also Cenite, supra note 175, at 45-46.
260 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002). See also Cenite, supra note 175, at
47.
261 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
262 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671-72 (2004) (remanding so that filtering
technology, which may protect children effectively and still not restrain the speech of
adults, could be researched as an alternative to COPA).
263 Lawrence Walters and Clyde Dewitt argue on behalf of national standards be-
cause of how the Internet has changed the meaning of "community" by being simulta-
neously more participatory, less regulated, and less intrusive than any other media.
Walters & Dewitt, supra note 175, at 60, 63. Partly because of the Internet, we are
more homogenous as a nation, and community is defined by interest rather than
geography. Id. at 67, 69. The Internet has also rendered nationwide standards know-
able; the government can easily monitor what people consume and therefore what is
tolerable to them. Id. at 68. Walters and DeWitt imply that the standard for obscenity
should track these consumer choices, which would undoubtedly bring the real variety
and pervasiveness of porn use to light. In contrast, Mark Cenite argues that national
standards, while solving some issues of overbreadth, would raise others. Cenite, supra
note 175. The Court would have to choose between using a national average of all
community standards, which would still impermissibly restrict speech, or only regulat-
ing material offensive to every community in the nation, which would likely result in
no regulation at all. Id. at 60-61. Cenite sees the real problem as the categorical
exclusion of sexual speech from protection and the real solution as the elimination of
community standards altogether. Id.
190
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VII. OUR SECRET GARDEN: 26 4 A NEW SANCTUARY
FOR SEXUAL SPEECH
Thus far, this Article has discussed why the way sexual speech
has been handled under the First Amendment-including how ob-
scenity is distinguished from other pornography-no longer makes
sense for our time. It has explored a case that brought pornogra-
phy under the protection of the Due Process Clause and argued
that its reasoning was doctrinally sound. This Part will explore why
bringing pornography under the Due Process Clause is not only
valid but also desirable for both pornographers and activists who
work for sexuality rights.
In working backwards to find a constitutional "home" for a
vulnerable right, it is important to ask why pornography should be
afforded protection in the first place. Leonore Tiefer, a professor
of psychiatry and sex therapist, identifies five concrete harms that
befall women when pornography is censored: a loss in empower-
ment that comes from being overprotected; an increase in the
shame and stigmatization that women feel about their sexual fanta-
sies; a loss of opportunity for women to learn about the variety of
sexual expression; a loss in income and self-sufficiency for women
who work in the sex industry; and the strengthening of the relig-
ious right.2 65 By extrapolation, one can argue that pornography
serves the following positive interests: It expands the imagination
and increases the empowerment of the viewer by offering the
world of sexuality in all its variety to explore; 266 it affirms the self-
worth of the viewer by showing she is not alone in having a particu-
lar fantasy; it offers the only field of employment where women,
gay men, and transgender women are paid twice to ten times more
than white, heterosexual men;26 7 and it offers a mode of personal
264 This subtitle references the 1973 book My Secret Garden, a collection of real
women's sexual fantasies sent to the author Nancy Friday in letters. The book was
part of a cultural-and for many a personal-sexual revolution, as it presented a lush
variety of fantasies-ranging from married sex, to bisexuality, to rape fantasies and
bestiality-without judgment. NANCY FRIDAY, MY SECRET GARDEN (2d ed. 1998). The
author republished the book in 1998, asking, "How could it be, you might ask, that
women today, at the turn of the century, would still think they were the only Bad Girls
with erotic thoughts? What kind of prison is this that women impose on themselves?"
Id. at xvi.
265 Tiefer, supra note 237, at 96-100.
266 As Tiefer's essay responded to the radical feminist rejection of pornography,
Tiefer framed her arguments in terms of the harm and value of pornography to wo-
men. This Article's opinion is that what harms and benefits women, harms and bene-
fits society as a whole. Also, most of what Tiefer describes can be applied to those who
are not women.
267 E-mail conversation between Lena Ramon and author (Oct. 1, 2006) (on file
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resistance to political forces that seek to suppress sexual autonomy.
Professor Jeffrey Sherman would add that, for gay men, pornogra-
phy and the access it provides to depictions of gay male sexuality
are an indispensable part of developing self-esteem and beginning
to integrate one's sexuality into the rest of one's life.268 As a per-
former, Lena Ramon spoke of her interests in exploring pornogra-
phy as an art form; a career that allowed her to pay her college
tuition and buy a home; and the valuable relationships that she
developed through performing and creating with the same col-
leagues over the years.269
While opponents of pornography decry its general effect on
public morals, it seems that the goods derived from pornography
by makers and viewers are more personal and centered in imagina-
tion, relationships, identity, expression, and ambition. Professor
Greg Magarian summarizes these interests as the pursuit of "per-
sonal autonomy. ' 270 He argues that certain kinds of speech are
especially good at furthering personal autonomy, while others
serve the goal of fostering political debate.271 Speech has not been
protected adequately under the First Amendment partially because
these vastly different interests have complicated the doctrine.2 7 2
He contends that political and nonpolitical speech would both be
more effectively protected if they were analyzed under different
constitutional rubrics.2 7 3 Lawrence v. Texas, by emphatically draw-
ing a connection between sexuality and personal autonomy, opens
a door to locate sexual and other non-political speech within the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause, leaving the First
Amendment to better protect political discourse.
274
Yet if sexual speech, including that which might be obscene, is
protected as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause,
the question becomes what, if any, government regulation of such
speech should be allowed. Lawrence also offers guidance here by
with the Author). "Gay" and "heterosexual" mean, in this context, those willing to
perform as such on film.
268 See Sherman, supra note 245.
269 Ramon, supra note 146.
270 Magarian, supra note 215, at 273.
271 Id. at 251-55.
272 Id. at 254-55.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 249. Magarian maintains that the First Amendment should remain open
to those parties whose speech advances political debate, even if that speech is sexual
or artistic. He argues against the categorization of speech that has characterized First
Amendment doctrine, whereby the obscene can be excluded out of hand. See also
Hunter, supra note 63.
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setting the standard regulations must meet in order to overcome
individuals' interest in personal autonomy. The government must
justify its regulations on more than enforcement of a moral code; it
must prove that the speech causes tangible, concrete harms that its
regulations are designed to prevent.275 Magarian advocates for a
case-by-case analysis: When a producer is prosecuted for obscenity,
she will have the opportunity to present evidence that her products
contribute to both her customers' and her own personal auton-
omy.276 If she succeeds, the law that infringes on her right to make
these materials will be presumed unconstitutional, unless the gov-
ernment proves that her materials cause concrete harms.277 The
Miller standard, 27 ' as it is based on moral harm and gives no value
to personal autonomy interests, would be eliminated.279
What standard would take its place? In the 1980s, radical femi-
nists Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon wrote and passed
an ordinance for the city of Indianapolis giving women a civil cause
of action against purveyors of obscenity that was violent toward, or
subordinate of, women. 80 While this standard is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because it blatantly discriminated
against pornography on the basis of its political content,28 ' a sub-
stantive due process analysis provides such theories a new opening,
as Magarian argues.282 If governments imposed such a definition
of obscenity, they could argue that the tangible harms to women-
namely increased violence towards women and decreased equality
in society-overbear pornography producers' and consumers' au-
tonomy interests.
However, any blanket assertion that sexual speech causes tan-
gible harms to women must be examined carefully. In Canada, a
similar law was upheld and has become the standard for illegal sex-
ual speech. 28 3 As Mark Silver, who analyzed the Canadian opinion
upholding this standard, observed, the analysis focused on the
275 Magarian, supra note 215, at 290-91.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 307.
278 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
279 Magarian, supra note 215, at 307-08.
280 INDIANAPOLIS, IND. CIY COUNCIL GEN. ORDINANCE Ch.16, § 1 6-3(q) (1984).
This statute was held unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in Am. Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985). For a brief history of the ordinance, see
Mark S. Silver, Rethinking Harm and Pornography: Conflicting Personal and Community
Views, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 171, 180 n.114 (2002).
281 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 332.
282 Magarian, supra note 215, at 309.
283 Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen, [1992] S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
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harm to women and equality though it failed to consult the women
affected and purportedly harmed.284 It is therefore not surprising
that very little data exist to support the idea that obscenity actually
causes these harms.2 85 Scientific studies show that short-term atti-
tudinal changes in men as a result of being exposed to violent por-
nography are more often the result of the violent content than the
sexual content, and there are even studies suggesting that an in-
crease in the availability of pornography decreases aggressive be-
havior. 2 6 The Canadian court acknowledged that the connection
between violent pornography and tangible harms was difficult to
prove, but it took a normative approach, guarding against a "rea-
soned apprehension of harm." '287 Silver concluded that the argu-
ment in support of a politically defined obscenity standard was
ultimately "a moral argument in the guise of community stand-
ards. '288 This close examination of the reasons given to regulate
pornography-weighed against a real acknowledgement of what
good pornography might produce-is exactly why a substantive
due process analysis is appropriate for sexual speech. It leads to
the development of obscenity laws that, if they exist at all, are based
in people's actual experience.
Some jurists will object to this shift based on "the queasiness
that reflexively greets any proposal to extend substantive due pro-
cess."289 Lawrence, however, in its final lines, offers a vision of the
Due Process Clause that invites and encourages just this kind of
extension:
284 Silver, supra note 280, at 184-85. Lena Ramon was especially offended by this
particular theory. "It is so unconscionable to me that people from outside can come
up with some half-baked theory and just screw up our lives. It's downright insulting
when it starts to be about what harms women because I'm a woman, and I work in this
industry." Ramon, supra note 146.
285 Koppelman, supra note 218, at 1664-67. Koppelman outlines the types of stud-
ies attempting to prove a link between men's exposure to violent pornography and
their tendency to commit violence against women. Id. at 1664. He claims that even
the most suggestive of these studies either establish only short-term attitudinal
changes that may have no relevance outside of a lab, or they show large-scale trends
that fail to prove whether aggressive men tend to watch pornography or whether por-
nography causes aggression. Id. at 1665. The studies also fail to identify violent por-
nography over other pornography as a significant predictor of aggression toward
women. Id. at 1665-66.
286 Id. at 1665.
287 Butler, [1992] S.C.R. at 504.
288 Silver, supra note 280, at 184-85.
289 Magarian, supra note 215, at 298 ("This argument rests on questionable prem-
ises-that any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for a complex
and sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal freedom should be a stingy excep-




Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution en-
dures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.
29 0
CONCLUSION: MAKING LAW FOR PORN STARS
I think it would actually be hard to pass a law if the law's purpose was
to protect porn perforMers.
29 1
Had Extreme Associates been upheld-and the Miller standard
eradicated along with traditional obscenity laws-there would still
be a place for law in the production of pornography. But what
kind of law could develop within these new parameters? What tan-
gible harms might government seek to ameliorate, and what public
and personal goods might government foster through statute and
regulation?29 2 For Lena Ramon, there is an urgent need for the
law to turn away from conjectural harms to public morals and ad-
dress the condition of those actually involved in the industry."' :
She proposes that the government could start by treating the porn
industry like any other industry by imposing OSHA safety regula-
tions, from clean sets to mandated condom use. "In an ideal world
we would be able to legislate safe sex. ' 29 4 She says there is enor-
mous resistance to this idea both from the market-driven main-
stream of the industry, afraid no one will buy its products, and
from porn-performer advocates, afraid that regulation would lead
to an even more unsafe underground industry.2 9 5 Ramon sug-
gested that these factors make this area ripe for government regu-
lation because it would force consistency. 29 6  "If tomorrow
everything came coated in latex, that's what the consumer would
290 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
291 Ramon, supra note 146.
292 The following suggested legal interventions are based on a hypothetical govern-
ment that acknowledges the value of pornography and of pornographers and porn
performers as citizens and artists. Regulation, in such a world, would raise new de-
bates about how best to respect autonomy interests that are not fully fleshed out here.
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buy. "297
Other legal interventions could prevent harm and promote
good for both performers and consumers by addressing the porn
industry as a workplace and a creative laboratory. Ramon spoke of
the unique brands of racism and sexism that have developed in the
industry because of the way certain bodies are commodified.298
While there is a certain honesty to producing what consumers
want, there may also be value in helping porn performers hold the
industry to the same non-discrimination standards as other employ-
ers. Government, as a funding agency, could also sponsor artistic
innovation in pornography or fund small businesses owned by
pornographers who are women, people of color, gay, lesbian, and
transgender. This kind of state action would advance the viability
of speakers who want to use this medium to counter violent
messages available in other pornography, while relieving of them
of the generalized fear of prosecution under which the entire in-
dustry, particularly the innovators, now live.
In the year between Extreme Associates' victory and its loss,
the district court opinion was cited by owners of Internet sites;
29 9
"adult entertainment establishments '' 300 or sex clubs; and adult
video stores in challenging city zoning ordinances and obscenity
laws. 0 ' It was even raised by the plaintiffs challenging Alabama's
anti-sex-toy laws in the ongoing Williams case.30 2 No court other
than the Western District of Pennsylvania accepted Extreme Associ-
ates' line of argument, even before it was overturned.30 3 If the case
had been upheld, it might have expanded the range of claims avail-
able to members of the sex industry. It also may have broadened
the boundaries of liberty for all Americans. It was the first success-
ful use of Lawrence that actually reached for the vista to which Law-
rence points. Yet the facts only encompassed private consensual
sexual speech to which the government sought to attach criminal
penalties. When the Supreme Court foreclosed these arguments, it
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Brief of Plaintiff at 24-26, 30, 32, 75, Retail Enter. v. King, 2006 WL 1626997
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (No. 5:05-CV-129-OC-1OGRJ).
300 Brief of Plaintiff at 4, 832 Corp., Inc. v. Gloucester Twp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 614
(D.N.J. 2005) (No. 04-1140 (JEI)).
301 Complaint at 5, 12, Belton Gifts v. City of Belton, 2005 WL 1828045 (W.D. Mo.
2005) (No. 4:05-CV-00548).
302 Brief and Cross-Motion of Defendant at 4, Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d
1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (No. CV 98-S-1938-NE).
303 See, e.g., United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 785 (5th Cir. 2005).
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signaled a turn for the worse for sexuality-rights advocates. As Ra-
mon put it, "They're going after the most flamboyant fish now to
set a precedent. Then they'll be able to start coming after the rest
of us.
'"304
304 Ramon, supra note 267.
2006]

